I have called moral relativism a "straw man." And I believe it is.
People who would identify as moral relativists are at a disadvantage: there are things that they themselves would have a hard time being able to justify doing. We all have things that make us uncomfortable. My last post, for example, about anthropophagy, is something that I would have a hard time justifying. Maybe, if by some freak accident, I was trapped and forced to, my biological programming would take over...but I am thankful that I have not been there, in such a dark place.
I consider myself a pacifist and a humanist. Even still, I do not doubt that my biological hard-wiring is there. Should the need arise, I would not hesitate to protect myself. But, again, I am thankful that my circumstances have been fortunate.
Murder, war, death: these are all part of nature. We are genetically programmed to survive and adapt. But there is a difference between having these dormant traits and acting upon them when they are no longer required.
Where moral relativism ends is where complex societies begin. Once we have domesticated animals, planted crops, have sources of fresh water, access to shelter, etc., the need to flex those war muscles approaches zero. We start to "feel" that murder and war is wrong because we no longer have those needs, in much the same way that cannibalism now "feels" wrong.
Universal human rights, Natural Law, or whatever labels you choose to give them, are those properties that emerge once we start to have our needs addressed. No one can deny that they exist because they, too, are part of our genetic programming. Something "feels wrong" for a reason--notably because those traits, if unchecked, can lead to destructive consequences. And sometimes what "feels wrong" flies in the face of common sense or consistent ethical behavior.
I'm afraid I don't understand how this is at odds with all forms and scales of moral relativism sufficient to dismiss the concept entirely.
ReplyDeleteWhen I talk about moral relativism, I mean it in its purest (albeit slippery slope) form of moral nihilism--the same way it is conventionally understood by Ratzinger, et. al. Defenders of the term can, perhaps redefine it as something else, but then, that is an analytic proposition and somewhat tautological. My point is that it's neither here nor there; if you reach the same conclusions from logic and call it "the new moral relativism" or if you arrive at it through religion and Divine Law, you end up in the same place, in the best case.
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